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The Mathematics of Mutual Aid: Robust Welfare Guarantees
for Decentralized Financial Organizations
CHRISTIAN IKEOKWU, Oberlin College, Ohio
Mutual aid groups often serve as informal financial organizations that don’t rely on any central authority or
legal framework to resolve disputes. Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal financial
organizations common in settings where communities have reduced access to formal financial institutions. In
a rosca, a fixed group of participants regularly contribute small sums of money to a pool. This pool is then
allocated periodically typically using lotteries or auction mechanisms. Roscas are empirically well-studied in
the development economics literature. Due to their dynamic nature, however, roscas have proven challenging
to examine theoretically. Theoretical analyses within economics have made strong assumptions about features
such as the number or homogeneity of participants, the information they possess, their value for saving across
time, or the number of rounds. This work presents an algorithmic study of roscas. We use techniques from
the price of anarchy in auctions to characterize their welfare properties under less restrictive assumptions
than previous work. We also give a comprehensive theoretical study of the various Rosca formats. Using the
smoothness framework of Syrgkanis and Tardos [46] and other techniques we show that the most common
rosca formats have welfare within a constant factor of the best possible. This evidence further rationalizes
these organizations’ prevalence as a vehicle for mutual aid. Roscas present many further questions where
algorithmic game theory may be helpful; we discuss several promising directions.

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Mutual Aid and Informal Financial Organizations
This map shows the number of adults without access to a bank account or formal credit in each
country.

Fig. 1. Source: Map O.3 in Demirguc-Kunt et al. [24]

As you can see a large percentage of low- and middle-income countries have high numbers
of people without formal credit, But as shown on the map this isn’t a problem exclusive to lowand middle-income nations. Globally over 1.7B people don’t have access to any formal financial
institutions. In the U.S alone, over 7.1M adults don’t have a bank account [21] and over 45M don’t
have a credit score [18]. When people aren’t able to access such vehicles, they have difficulty saving
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for purchases and investments and don’t have a robust safety net to deal with negative unforeseen
circumstances. Unfortunately, the people who are most unable to deal with unforeseen shocks are
most likely to experience them [1]. As we’ve seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, such shocks
can have devastating consequences and disproportionately affects ethnic/racial minorities and
other economically vulnerable groups. For example, before coronavirus, 33% of White households
in North Carolina households would have been unable to cover all of their expenses for three
months without assistance while this number was 63% and 68% for Black and Latinx households
respectively [30].
Mutual aid groups often serve as a way for people to self-organize to address these issues.
Mutual aid groups go beyond just financial help and take a specialized local approach to supporting
communities. As a result, they are more effective because small mutual aid groups are able to
act quickly and provide targeted support without dealing with incentive issues like corruption or
moral hazard that plague centralized approaches. Mutual aid is also distinguished from centralized
resource distribution by its focus on reciprocity, horizontality, and equality. Mutual aid groups
remove the divide between helper and helped and can effectively identify assess whether a person
lacks sufficient resources. In this way, they not only reach out to people left behind by centralized
relief programs but also go beyond crisis relief and offer community empowerment. Jun and Lance
[31] show that such grassroots measures have been surprisingly effective at responding to the
pandemic. In fact, the global pandemic has seen a rise of such mutual aid vehicles in the western
nations see [20] and [47]. Mesch et al. [39] reports that 21% of U.S. households indicated that their
giving to charitable organizations focused on purposes besides basic needs/health and religion
(e.g., education, arts, the environment) decreased during the COVID-19 pandemic, instead U.S.
households prioritized giving to meet the pressing needs of those in their area.
Mutual aid often takes shape in the form of informal financial organizations that don’t rely on
any legal framework or central authority to resolve disputes or enforce compliance. They are
often used by the developing world, the economically vulnerable and immigrant and refugee
communities see [6] and [38]. In addition to the social support role these typically play informal
financial organizations are used for (1) Informal Insurance like in risk-sharing networks (see
Fafchamps and Lund [26] for an example), (2) Informal Savings like in Accumulating Savings and
Credit Associations (see [11]) and (3) Informal Credit like in lending clubs (see [22].) But with such
simple structures, no central enforcer or legal framework how effective can these informal financial
organizations be at allocating resources to those with the most need? In this paper, we investigate
this question for the Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (roscas) an incredibly widespread
mutual aid organization and show that it is effective at allocating resources to those with the most
need.
1.2 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
Rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) are informal financial organizations that are
commonly used in low- and middle-income nations as well as many immigrant and refugee
populations. These institutions serve as one mechanism for saving, credit, and insurance – among
other forms of financial and social support – in settings where communities have reduced access to
centralized financial institutions. Roscas often function as follows: a fixed number of participants,
usually from similar socio-economic backgrounds, come together to contribute small sums of
money to a pot in a periodic manner. At each meeting, the pot is then allocated to one participant
who has not yet received it. The allocation is usually determined by lottery or auction but roscas,
but flexibility is innate to roscas and so there are many variations on this format see Ardener [6].
Once a full round is completed and each participant has received a pot exactly once, the rosca
may disband or start over for another full round. Recipients of the pot often use their influx of
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cash to invest, especially in more expensive durable goods such as farm equipment, appliances,
or vehicles. As a result, this simple setup enables participants to effectively perform peer-to-peer
lending: members who receive the pot earlier borrow from those who receive it later.
The prevalence of roscas cannot be overstated. They have been observed as endemic to communities on five continents; [16] alone documents roscas in 85 countries. [17] estimates that roscas
account for about one-half of Cameroon’s national savings, and [8] estimates that over 1/6 of
households in Ethiopia’s highlands participate in ekub – the region’s variant of roscas. Roscas are
also vital fixtures in immigrant populations, enabling members to find community and financial
resources where such things might not otherwise be readily available.
The distinguishing characteristic of the rosca according to Ardener [6] is the recurrent rotation
of funds. The rosca allocation mechanism has often been used as a classification criteria in both
the economic and anthropological literature Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen [37]. Table 1 describes the
different rosca categories in each column. The name of the Rosca category is in the first row, the
method for determining allocation order is in the second row and examples are described in the
subsequent rows.
Fixed Rosca
Fixed criterion
Wealth Level [36]

Random Rosca
Lottery
Upfront lottery random
rosca [13]: lottery for receipt dates is held before
the first meeting

Social Status [6]

Sequential lottery random
rosca [37]: the lottery is
held at the beginning of
each meeting

Trust/Risk [38]

Bidding Rosca
Contribution amount
Premium bidding rosca
[37]: unallocated members bid to receive the
pot that meeting by
promising higher future
contributions to the pot

Market Rosca
Negotiation
Random roscas with aftermarket [38]: members
are given initial random
assignments and are allowed to switch positions through bilateral
agreements.
Discount bidding rosca Divisible rosca. [6]: mem[37]: the bids are dis- bers are allowed to own
counts to the contribu- fractions or multiple
tions to the pot from the shares in the rosca and
other members
members can split shares
Upfront bidding rosca
[13]: the bids to determine receipt dates is
held before the first
meeting

Table 1. Rosca Taxonomy

Roscas’ ubiquity has prompted nearly three decades of study by economists, starting with Besley
et al. [13]. Economic theory in particular has sought to explain the way roscas function as insurance,
saving, and most importantly, lending devices for members. Theoretical studies of roscas have
proved challenging for three key reasons. First, roscas are dynamic: participants make decisions in
an online fashion, and condition their future decisions on past outcomes. Second, as participants are
often uncertain about each others’ financial needs, a theory of roscas must accommodate incomplete
information. Finally, the sums of money in play in roscas are significant enough that agents’ utilities
are nonlinear. The standard economic approach of solving for auction equilibrium under any one
of these phenomena in isolation is already challenging. More comprehensive approaches have only
succeeded with aggressive simplifying assumptions.

Christian Ikeokwu

4

This work initiates an algorithmic study of roscas. In particular, the theory of worst-case analysis
of games, or price of anarchy provides tools for studying welfare properties of equilibria without
directly solving for them. Using these tools, we investigate the allocative efficiency of roscas i.e
how well roscas do at allocating resources to the members with the most need. We ask how well
these institutions coordinate saving and lending to people whose opportunities to invest a rosca’s
pot may be heterogeneous across individuals and across time. We show that under a wide range of
assumptions on both people’s values and the rules of the pot allocation protocol itself, roscas are
able coordinate a groups’ lending and borrowing in a way which approximately maximizes the
group’s total utility. In this way, we provide a flexible analysis to match and explain the diversity of
circumstances where roscas appear.
1.3 Our Contributions
To model saving and lending in roscas, we generalize the formulation of [14]. We assume each
agent seeks to purchase an investment such as a durable good, but only has means to do so upon
winning a rosca’s pot. We study the price of anarchy of a lottery, market-based and auction-based
roscas, where during each meeting, agents bid or make trades from initial assignments to choose a
winner among those who have not yet received a pot. Agents must weigh the value of investing
earlier against the utility-loss from spending their income to win. In an earlier version of this work,
on which we gave a spotlight talk at the NeurIPS 2020 Workshop on Fair AI in Finance and a short
talk at the IJCAI 2021 Workshop on AI for Social Good (AI4SG) we gave two main results:
• We showed that equilibria of the two most prevalent auction-based rosca formats, ascendingand descending-price auctions (Def 4.1) maximize the total utility of participants up to a
constant factor which degrades smoothly as peoples’ marginal values for money grows.
• We showed that any rosca that uses a “reasonable” pot allocation protocol each period is
guaranteed high equilibrium welfare. In other words, we gave sufficient conditions on singleitem auctions which guarantee that the rosca with that auction protocol has good welfare i.e
low price of anarchy (Def 3.3).
We proved these results using a variant of the smoothness framework developed in [46]. The
rosca setting required us to adapt the framework to three challenges. First, payments in each
stage of a rosca are typically redistributed among members, complicating the standard accounting.
Second, participants’ utilities depend on their payments (and rebates) in a nonlinear way. Finally,
the sequential nature of roscas doesn’t lend itself to standard smoothness composition arguments.
More comprehensive approaches at rosca analysis had only succeeded with aggressive simplifying
assumptions prior to that version. This version presents never before seen analysis and results,
that expands on the initial work in two significant ways:
• We go beyond auction based Roscas and show that most of the commonly observed Rosca
formats, inn general maximize the total utility of participants up to a constant factor. We
give this bounds for random, bidding and market roscas.
• We greatly expand the criteria for “reasonable” pot allocation protocol to include weakly
smooth mechanisms which include many canonical protocols like the second-price or vickrey
auction (Def. 4.4) and rederive all of our previous results with fewer assumptions.
The expanded theory for weakly smooth mechanism for bidding roscas and the addition of the theoretical analysis of market and random roscas to our initial analysis make this the first comprehensive
algorithmic study of Roscas.
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2 RELATED WORK
Extensive empirical evidence shows the pervasiveness and positive impact of these financial
institutions and their efficacy at improving economic, health, and social outcomes. In addition to
works already mentioned, Raccanello and Anand [43] document the use of roscas to finance high
healthcare expenditures and build wealth in Mexico. Aredo [8] demonstrates the dynamic and
flexible nature of roscas in Ethiopia and documents the wide variations on rosca that exist. Pasha
and Dayrra [42] show that ekub are a big engine of small business finance in Arba Minch and private
businesses actually prefer raising money from roscas than from formal financial organizations.
Amankwah et al. [4] and Alabi et al. [3] study roscas in Ghana, Ogujiuba et al. [41] in Nigeria,
and Kabuya [32] in Eswatini. Alabi et al. [3] show that people joined roscas for their perceived
efficiency in Ghana and show that roscas increased the development of micro and small enterprises.
Many studies analyze composition and participation differences across age, ethic, gender, and
socioeconomic lines. Adams Dale and Canavesi [2] and Ardener and Burman [7] show that rosca
participation is higher among women than men. Anderson and Baland [5] shows that employed
married women in Kenya at times use roscas as a way to take their income and save it in order
to protect their earnings from their husbands who may want to spend it immediately. Roscas are
known to often include members from similar socio-economic backgrounds, in part as a form of
insurance [8]. Nonetheless, Klonner [36] shows that intragroup diversity is associated with higher
rates of bidder altruism and more efficient intra-rosca allocations.
Economists have also studied the interaction of roscas with formal credit markets. For instance,
Besley et al. [14] show that while credit markets are more efficient than roscas, there are situations
in which one can expect a higher ex ante expected utility in roscas than formal credit markets.
Relatedly, Fang et al. [27] show that in cases where formal credit markets are present but imperfect,
roscas and credit markets can complement one another, thereby improving social welfare.
A different line of work studies roscas as a form of insurance. Klonner [34] develops the first such
model of roscas, comparing their performance to risk-sharing contracts. In this model, roscas can
serve as a form of financial intermediary and generate more returns for more risk-averse participants
who function as a sort of insurance provider. This work also analyzes the risk-sharing performance
of a simple set-up where a group of homogeneous people run several bidding roscas simultaneously.
He shows that this set-up performs as well as a linear risk-sharing contract and is more enforceable
since it carries fixed rather than variable contributions from the participants. Similarly, Baland et al.
[9] shows some previously-observed behaviors that may be deemed irrational can be explained by
considering roscas as a form of insurance. Calomiris and Rajaraman [19] empirically demonstrate
that roscas are used as a form of insurance. Using data from roscas in India, Calomiris and Rajaraman
[19] show the unpredictable needs for funds, is reflected by the volatility of interest rates implicit
in winning bids.
This work is most closely related to the micro-economic work on roscas. Besley et al. [13, 14]
lay the first theoretical model of roscas and subsequent studies focus on providing comparative
welfare guarantees, e.g., between random and bidding roscas, or between roscas and alternative
institutions. They make stronger asssumptions than us like homogeneity across participants and
participants values being homogenous across time. They( Besley et al. [13, 14]) show that both the
random and bidding rosca are inefficient but do not give bounds on this inefficiency like we do.
Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen [37] analyze differences between random and bidding roscas, again under
the assumption that people are saving for a large purchase. They allow for some heterogeneity in
people’s access to credit, Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen [37] again provide a comparative welfare analysis
between bidding and random roscas. They do not, however, quantify the welfare differences or loss
as we do.
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This work applies techniques from auction theory and the price of anarchy literature.Smoothness
is the main tool used to analayze roscas. Syrgkanis and Tardos [46] adapts the theory of smooth
games from Roughgarden [44] to auctions. They give a sufficient condition for a game to have
approximately-optimal equilibrium welfare, and show that smoothness is preserved in combination
with other smooth mechanisms. In addition, smoothness-derived guarantees generalize beyond
standard quasilinear, full-information settings to learning outcomes and Bayes-Nash equilibria, large
games Feldman et al. [28], risk-averse agents, Kesselheim and Kodric [33], and more. Roughgarden
et al. [45] give a complete survey.
3 WARMUP: RANDOM ROSCAS WITH AFTER-MARKET
We first analyze a simpler model of roscas to illustrate the kind of welfare analysis we will do on
the more analytically challenging auction based roscas. Ardener [6] reports that rosca in which
participants use a lottery to determine the receipt order i.e random roscas are the most common
rosca format. However as observed in Mequanent [38] often times the lottery is used just as an
initial assignment. Rosca members are free to trade places with each other later, such trades are
usually induced via side payments or as a result of altruism [38]. In this section we model these
Random Roscas with After-Market (Rram) and show that they are a 2-approximation of the optimal
assignment.
We first give a description of the general rosca process. Formally, a rosca for 𝑛 people takes place
over 𝑛 discrete time periods. Each period, three things occur. (1) Each person pays an amount 𝑝 0
into a common pot. (2) A winner for the 𝑛𝑝 0 units of money in the pot is decided among those who
have not yet won. (3) People make any payments 𝑝𝑖𝑡 induced by the selection process in period 𝑡.
This could be positive or negative depending on the selection process and the person’s outcomes.
ALGORITHM 1: General Rosca Process
input : A set members of members and an allocation procedure 𝑀
output : An 𝑛-dimensional array assignment where assignment[𝑡] is the person who receives the pot
in period 𝑡. An 𝑛 × 𝑛-dimensional payments where payments[𝑡] [𝑖] give 𝑖’s payments above
𝑝 0 in period 𝑡
active ← members;
assignment;
payments;
for 𝑡 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
pot ← 0;
for 𝑖 ← 1 to 𝑛 do
pot ← pot + members[𝑖].pay(𝑝 0 );
end
𝑤 ← M.Allocate(active, 𝑡, pot);
payments[𝑡] ← M.ChargePayments(active, 𝑡, pot);
assignment[𝑡] ← w;
Remove(active, 𝑤);
end
return assignment, payments;

The payments 𝑝 0 into the pot are decided ex ante, during the formation of the rosca. We will
not model the process of selecting 𝑝 0 , instead taking 𝑝 0 as given, See [13], [14], [34] for models
where 𝑝 0 is endogenous people can optimize over the choice of 𝑝 0 . As in previous models like [13],
[14], we do not think about rosca defaults and assume everyone pays their contribution. Empirical
evidence suggests this is reasonable as the personal cost of defaulting is high in informal financial
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organizations because these groups usually serve a social support role and rely on interpersonal
relationship. This social structure has been used in the nobel winning work of Banerjee and Duflo
[10] and by Besley and Coate [12] to improve default rates and credit access in rural impoverished
communities.
Roscas give individuals without access to banking a way to save for substantial investments
such as large durable goods. We assume each person desires to pay for a one-time investment,
yielding for person 𝑖 a utility stream of 𝜉𝑖𝑡 units at period 𝑡 if and only if the person has invested in
the past. This utility stream could be things like daily profit from a taxi to monthly crops from a
farm. We follow [13] and assume the cost of the investment is homogeneous across people, and
equal to the pot amount 𝑛𝑝 0 . However, we allow 𝜉𝑖𝑡 to vary across time and across people. In this
section while we are modelling a simple Rram, we assume people have quasilinear utilities i.e utility
functions that are linear in one argument. In our case, utilities are linear in wealth consumption,
in Section 5 we generalize this to concave utilities. Each period 𝑡, each person has initial wealth
level 𝑤𝑖𝑡 . In a Rram after paying 𝑝 0 into the pot and making additional side payments 𝑝𝑖𝑡 during
the after-market, where they make bilateral swap agreements after some initial assignment, the
person consumes their remaining wealth for period 𝑡 for some utility of 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 . Let I𝑖𝑡 indicate
whether a member has invested by time 𝑡. A person’s utility at time 𝑡 is thus 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 I𝑖𝑡 .
Let 𝑥 (𝑖) : [𝑛] → [𝑛] be a bijective map from people
to receipt periods, so 𝑥 (𝑖) = 𝑗 if person 𝑖
Í
receives the 𝑗th pot. We let 𝑣𝑖 : [𝑛] → R0+, 𝑣𝑖 ( 𝑗) = 𝑛𝑡=𝑗 𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 I𝑖𝑡 denote person 𝑖’s value
for receiving the pot in period 𝑗. We evaluate an assignment by the total utility it generates for all
participants i.e utilitarian social welfare
Definition 3.1 (Utilitarian Social Welfare). The Social Welfare for an assignment 𝑥 is given by
welf(𝑣, 𝑥) =

𝑛
Õ

𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖))

(1)

𝑖=1

We allow people to make pairwise trades if the trade is beneficial to overall social welfare. This
is reasonable, because even if the swap isn’t beneficial to one person an increase in social welfare
implies that the benefiting stakeholder could simply pay the other one to induce the trade. Thus
we say an outcome is swap-stable if there are no socially beneficial swaps.
Definition 3.2 (Swap-Stable). An assignment 𝑥 : [𝑛] → [𝑛] is swap-stable if ∀𝑖, 𝑗
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) + 𝑣 𝑗 (𝑥 ( 𝑗)) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 ( 𝑗)) + 𝑣 𝑗 (𝑥 (𝑖))

(2)

We adopt the convention that the optimal assignment OPT(𝑣) is 𝑥 (𝑖) = 𝑖 (we can simply relabel
people without loss of generality) we compare the utilitarian social welfare achieved by the rram to
that of the optimal assignment. To evaluate the quality of a protocol we compare the performance of
its outcomes (swap-stable) on an objective (social welfare) to that achieved by the optimal algorithm
OPT, i.e the algorithm that has perfect information and unlimited computing power and can force
everyone to do the optimal action for that objective. We express this quality as a ratio between the
worst objective function value of an outcome of our protocol and an optimal outcome. This ratio
is analogous to the approximation ratio from algorithm design and is called the price of anarchy
because it captures the cost to society from the lack of a benevolent central enforcer.
Definition 3.3 (Price of Anarchy).
Í𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑣 𝑥 (𝑖) (𝑥 (𝑖))
max Í𝑛
𝑥 ∈S S
𝑖=1 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖))
where SS here denotes the space of swap-stable assignments
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With all the relevant definitions, we now present the first welfare guarantee for random roscas
with after-markets
Lemma 3.4. Any assignment that is a swap stable has a price of anarchy at most 2
Proof. For all, 𝑖, 𝑗 swap-stable implies that
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) + 𝑣 𝑗 (𝑥 ( 𝑗)) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 ( 𝑗)) + 𝑣 𝑗 (𝑥 (𝑖))

(3)

Pick a specific 𝑖 and let 𝑗 = 𝑥 (𝑖) equation 3 becomes
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) + 𝑣 𝑥 (𝑖) (𝑥 (𝑥 (𝑖))) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑥 (𝑖))) + 𝑣 𝑥 (𝑖) (𝑥 (𝑖))

(4)

Summing across all 𝑖, since every person is assigned a pot (4) becomes
Õ
Õ
Õ
2
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) ≥
𝑣 𝑥 (𝑖) (𝑥 (𝑖)) +
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑥 (𝑖)))
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

Since 𝑣𝑖 (·) ≥ 0
2

Õ

𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) ≥

𝑖

Õ

𝑣 𝑥 (𝑖) (𝑥 (𝑖))

𝑖

But note the term on the right is just the welfare of the optimal assignment thus.
Õ
2
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖)) ≥ OPT(𝑣)
𝑖

OPT(𝑣)
OPT(𝑣)
2≥ Í
=
welf(𝑣, 𝑥)
𝑖 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑥 (𝑖))
and thus the price of anarchy of any swap-stable assignment 𝑥 is at most 2.

□

The following example constructed using linear programming shows that this bound is tight for
swap-stable matchings.
Example 3.5. Consider a 3-person Rosca let 𝑣 1 = {(1, 1), (2, 0), (3, 0)}, 𝑣 2 = {(1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 0)},
𝑣 3 = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0)} Then 𝑥 = {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 2)} is a swap-stable assignment however the
welfare achieved by the optimal assignment 𝑣 1 (1) + 𝑣 2 (2) + 𝑣 3 (3) = 2 while the welfare achieved by
our assignment 𝑣 1 (3) + 𝑣 2 (1) + 𝑣 3 (2) = 1. Thus swap-stable assignments have a price of anarchy
exactly 2.
Note that in this example people’s values are nonincreasing across time, this is interesting as
we will see in later sections this property is often helpful in improving the price of anarchy in
roscas1 . For full information and code used to construct this example see Appendix B. Its easy to
see that just the lottery part of the rram is no better than an 𝑛-approximation: just give everyone
value 0, except for one person, who needs the money in round 1. So the after-market is a powerful
mechanism for achieving high welfare in as shown by the fact that as the number of participants
grows large the welfare contributions from the initial assignment are meaningless
1 In the case of Rrams, this property doesn’t improve POA as the example also proves our bound is tight for nonincreasing
values
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4 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
4.1 Analytical Challenges for Bidding Roscas
Roscas which use some kind of auction to determine the receipt order are the most prevalent after
random roscas/rram see Ardener [6]. People’s bid in the rosca auctions are in terms of contributions
to the pot - either higher contributions or discounts to the other members. Typically these are held
using oral ascending or descending bid auctions in each round. These and the other main types of
single-item auctions that are relevant to this paper are described below.
Definition 4.1 (Ascending-bid auctions). Ascending-bid auctions, also called English auctions.
These auctions are carried out usually in real time, with bidders present either physically or virtually.
The seller gradually raises the price, bidders drop out until only one bidder remains, and that bidder
wins the item at this final price.
Definition 4.2 (Descending-bid auctions). Descending-bid auctions, also called Dutch auctions.
This is also an interactive auction format, in which the seller gradually lowers the price from some
high starting value until a bidder accepts and pays the current price.
Definition 4.3 (First-price sealed-bid auctions). First-price sealed-bid auctions(FPA). In this kind
of auction, bidders submit simultaneous “sealed bids” to the seller. The terminology comes from
the original format for such auctions, in which bids were written down and provided in sealed
envelopes to the seller, who would then open them all together. The highest bidder wins the object
and pays the value of their bid to the seller.
Definition 4.4 (Second-price sealed-bid auctions). Second-price sealed-bid auctions (SPA) , also
called Vickrey auctions. Bidders submit simultaneous sealed bids to the sellers; the highest bidder
wins the object and pays the value of the second-highest bid to the seller.
The ascending and descending-bid auctions have equivalent “outcomes” to the second and first
price auctions respectively. For the ascending-bid and second-price auctions you can see why from
thinking about an ascending-bid auction, in which bidders gradually drop out as the seller steadily
raises the price. The winner of the auction is the last bidder remaining, and they pay the price at
which the second-to-last bidder drops out. For an argument for the descending-bid and first-price
auction see Chapter 9 of [25]. For these reasons we will restrict our analysis to the FPA and SPA.
Theoretical studies of the auction outcomes in roscas have proved challenging for three key
reasons. First, roscas are dynamic: participants make decisions in an online fashion, and condition
their future decisions on past outcomes. Second, as participants are often uncertain about each
others’ financial needs, a theory of roscas must accommodate incomplete information. Finally, the
sums of money in play in roscas are significant enough that people’s utilities are nonlinear. The
standard economic approach of solving for auction equilibrium under any one of these phenomena
in isolation is already challenging. As highlighted in Section 2 more comprehensive approaches at
rosca analysis have only succeeded with aggressive simplifying assumptions. For these reasons
theory developed and adapted to analyze bidding roscas is significantly more involved than that
of rram and so in the following section we will take some time motivating and providing the
necessary background to understand the analyses for bidding roscas.
4.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design
In order to model and analyze welfare in roscas, this work primarily uses tools developed in
the algorithmic game theory (AGT) literature. Here, we introduce the necessary concepts and
terminology from the AGT literature; for a comprehensive and more general definitions, see Nisan
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et al. [40]. First, we define basic terminology then we discuss how we capture the idea of a stable/final
outcome in a strategic situation.
A game or mechanism is any interaction between intelligent and strategic people (usually referred
to as agents) where agents’ actions or strategies affect their’s and other’s outcomes. A large number
of everyday interactions can be modeled as games and thus thinking formally about and developing
the theory of games is broadly important. For example, the Oberlin Computer Science Department
(OCCS) wants to give students a chance to explore a topic they are interested in at a high level
through the honors program. However, there is a limited number of faculty with a limited capacity
to help students with an honors project so they could come up with the “honors application game”
to help them effectively match professors to students. Factoring in what kinds of outcomes they
want, they decide the rules of the application process/game. For the 𝑛 students/agents, {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛}
who are interested in doing honors with some professor, the rules of the game determine the
set of possible actions/strategies 𝑆𝑖 for each agent 𝑖. To participate in the application game, each
agent 𝑖 selects a strategy 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , e.g which professor to target in their application. We will use
𝑠 = (𝑠 1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛 ) = (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠 −𝑖 ) to denote the vector of strategies selected by the agents, 𝑠𝑖 is the strategy
agent 𝑖 picks, 𝑠 −𝑖 is the (𝑛 − 1)-dimensional vector of the strategies played by all other agents and
𝑆 = ×𝑖 𝑆𝑖 denotes the set of all possible ways agents could pick strategies.
The actions 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 selected by the agents determines the outcome for each agent, and agents
would prefer some outcomes over others. We specify agents’ preferences over outcomes using the
numerical values given by the utility function 𝑢𝑖 : 𝑆 → R. Thus 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠) – or equivalently 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠 −𝑖 )
– denotes an agent 𝑖’s utility from a certain outcome. In our illustrative example, since students
are trying to maximize their chances of getting matched with a professor, they factor in all the
information available, consider their resources and try to think about how the other students and
the professors are going to act. Since the students are rational they act in a way that maximizes
their chances of achieving a desirable outcome. If every agents is acting that way, then their actions
form a stable outcome or equilibrium.
Definition 4.5 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy vector 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is said to be a Nash Equilibrium if for
all players 𝑖 and each alternate strategy 𝑠𝑖′ ∈ 𝑆𝑖
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖′, 𝑠 −𝑖 )

(5)

This corresponds to the concept of a stable outcome because it says no one has any utility to
gain from unilaterally deviating from the current strategy. As you might expect such a strategy
might not always exist. In addition, a student might not know how many other students are
applying or what their preferences are we say they have incomplete information. What strategy
maximizes payoff depends on what the other students’ preferences are, so students must now pick
their strategies from a distribution based on their beliefs about other students’ preferences. Such
a randomized strategy is called a mixed strategy and always exist for any game with a finite set
of players and strategies [40], though they are generally hard to find (see Daskalakis et al. [23]).
Students have some idea of what other students’ preferences might be based on previous years and
other experiences, thus they have a distribution on the preferences of the other students and can
now pick a strategy to maximize their expected payoff.
Definition 4.6 (Bayes-Nash Equilibrium). A strategy vector 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is said to be a Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) if for all players 𝑖 and each alternate strategy 𝑠𝑖′ ∈ 𝑆𝑖
E[𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠 −𝑖 )] ≥ E[𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖′, 𝑠 −𝑖 )]

(6)
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Bayes-Nash Equilibria allow you to predict how rational people should/would act in a game.
Mechanism design aims to design games that have equilibria with desirable outcomes to the mechanism designer. Henceforth we will use 𝑠 to denote an equilibrium strategy while 𝑎 represents a
more general action or strategy that might not necessarily be an equilibrium.
5 FORMAL MODEL OF ROSCAS
We now present our model of Bidding Roscas, following [13], [14], as in Section 3 a rosca for 𝑛
agents takes place over 𝑛 discrete time periods. Each period, three things occur. (1) Each agent pays
an amount 𝑝 0 into a common pot. (2) A winner for the 𝑛𝑝 0 units of money in the pot is decided
among those who have not yet won. (3) In roscas that allocate by auction, we assume payments are
distributed evenly amongst the non-winning members as a third step in the process, as is common
in practice. We refer to this latter process as the internalized seller.
Roscas give individuals without access to banking a way to save for substantial investments
such as large durable goods. We assume each agent desires to pay for a one-time investment,
yielding for agent 𝑖 a utility stream of 𝜉𝑖𝑡 units at period 𝑡 if and only if the agent has invested in
the past. We follow [13] and assume the cost of the investment is homogeneous across agents,
and equal to the pot amount 𝑛𝑝 0 . However, we allow 𝜉𝑖𝑡 to vary across time and across agents.
We further assume each agent has concave, nonnegative utility 𝑈 for wealth consumption each
period. Concave utillities is the standard way to model risk-averse agents (like the typical rosca
participant) as small changes in wealth would lead to large changes in utility when an agent has
low wealth. Each period 𝑡, each agent has initial wealth level 𝑤. After paying 𝑝 0 into the pot and
making additional payments 𝑝𝑖𝑡 to the auction mechanism, the agent consumes their remaining
wealth for period 𝑡 for utility 𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ). Let I𝑖𝑡 indicate whether the agent has invested by
time 𝑡. An agent’s utility at time 𝑡 is thus 𝑈𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 I𝑖𝑡 .
We study the utilitarian social welfare of the rosca, given by
Õ Õ
Õ Õ
Welf =
𝜉𝑖𝑡 I𝑖𝑡 +
𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ).
(7)
𝑖

𝑡

𝑖

𝑡

As our benchmark, we consider the optimal ordering for pot allocation, i.e. one-to-one function 𝑗 ∗
from agents to time periods maximizing the sum of agents’ utility streams. Note that we may also
allow wealth redistribution, but the concavity of 𝑈 implies any such redistribution is suboptimal.
Hence, our welfare benchmark is given by
𝑛
Õ Õ
OPT = max
𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑛 2𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 ),
𝑗∗:[𝑛]→[𝑛]
𝑖

𝑡 =𝑗∗(𝑖)

The summation in OPT is the utility agents get from allocation OPT this is maximized in the optimal
allocation. The second term is the base utility agents enjoy from their starting wealth after they’ve
made their rosca contributions. The 𝑛 2 comes from the fact that 𝑛 agents are making payments in 𝑛
periods. We seek to measure the worst-case approximation ratio between Welf and OPT i.e the
price of anarchy.
We finally note three assumptions on 𝑈 . First, we have assumed homogeneity of 𝑈 . This is valid
in practice: participants in roscas tend to possess similar socioeconomic status (see [38], [19]), and
thus it is reasonable to assume similar utility for wealth 2 . Second, we will assume in what follows
that the slope of 𝑈 is bounded. This matches the observation that investments from roscas tend to be
significant (hence 𝑈 ′ (𝑥) := 1 is unreasonable), but not so large as to dwarf individuals’ livelihoods
[8]. We will parametrize our welfare approximations by the bounds on 𝑈 ’s slope. Finally, note that
2 Note

that similar socioeconomic status doesn’t preclude varying investment opportunities or needs for large outlays of
cash, and hence the 𝜉𝑖𝑡 may yet be heterogeneous.
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multiplicative approximation guarantees only improve as 𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 ) grows. It will therefore be
entirely without loss to take 𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 ) = 0.
5.1 Roscas as Auctions
We now give definitions necessary to study the bidding rosca. In the process, we will recast roscas
in more standard auction-theoretic notation.
A multi-round allocation setting consists of 𝑛 agents and 𝑚 items to be allocated, one item per
period An allocation consists of a mapping from the items to the agents. Each agent has a real-valued
valuation 𝑣𝑖 = (𝑣𝑖1, . . . , 𝑣𝑖𝑚 ) over the items 3 , and agents are unit-demand: their value 4 for a set 𝔖 of
items is max 𝑗 ∈𝔖 𝑣𝑖𝑗 . Let V𝑖 be the set of possible valuations of agent 𝑖. An outcome in a multi-round
mechanism is an allocation 𝑥 and payment vector 𝑝. Allocations are given by 𝑥 = (𝑥 1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛 ),
where each 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, . . . , 𝑥𝑖𝑛 ) is an indicator vector, and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 if and only if 𝑖 receives item 𝑗.
Denote by X the space of feasible allocations. Payments are of the form 𝑝𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖1, . . . , 𝑝𝑖𝑚 ), with
each agent making payments each period. We assume agents’ utilities to be additively-separable
with convex disutility function 𝐶 (defined below) for payments:
Õ
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 ) = 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑥𝑖 −
𝐶 (𝑝𝑖𝑗 ).
𝑗

The rosca setting maps into this framework in the following way: each pot in a rosca is a distinct
Í
item (with 𝑚 = 𝑛). An agent 𝑖 with utilities 𝜉𝑖1, . . . , 𝜉𝑖𝑛 then has value 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 𝑛𝑘=𝑗 𝜉𝑖𝑘 for winning
the 𝑗th pot (and with later pots providing no additional value). Note that in this formulation, 𝑣𝑖𝑗
is decreasing in 𝑗 since agents only gain utility after they win a pot, and increasing 𝑗 implies
winning the pot later in time. The disutility function 𝐶 for payments in a rosca can be taken to be
Í
Í
Í
Í
𝐶 (𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) = −𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ), since 𝑗 𝜉𝑖𝑗 I𝑖𝑗 + 𝑗 𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) = 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑗 𝐶 (𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) and 𝑗 𝜉𝑖𝑗 I𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑥𝑖
Í 𝑣𝑖
by definition. Under these assumptions, we have 𝑖 𝑢𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 ) is exactly equal to the social welfare
given by (7).
We assume 𝐶 is non-decreasing in 𝑝 which is equivalent to 𝑈 being decreasing with payments
and 𝐶 (0) = 0, which is equivalent to 𝑈 (𝑤 − 𝑝 0 ) = 0. Since 𝑈 ’s slope is bounded this is equivalent to
saying that 𝛼 ≤ 𝐶 ′ (𝑝) ≤ 𝛽 where 𝛼, 𝛽 > 0. These assumptions imply some convenient properties
of 𝐶 (·):
i. 𝛼𝑥 ≤ 𝐶 (𝑥) ≤ 𝛽𝑥, −𝛼𝑥 ≤ 𝐶 (𝑥), −𝐶 (𝑥) ≤ 𝛽𝑥 for any 𝑥 ≥ 0
ii. −𝛼𝑥 ≤ −𝐶 (𝑥) ≤ −𝛽𝑥, 𝛼𝑥 ≤ −𝐶 (𝑥), 𝐶 (𝑥) ≤ −𝛽𝑥 for any 𝑥 ≤ 0
Some of our results hold for general mechanism not just allocation settings so it is useful to
define more general notation as well. However, picture an allocation setting like an auction when
trying to think of concrete mechanisms. It is also useful to differentiate between equilibrium and
non-equilibrium strategies, henceforth we will adopt the convention that 𝑠 denotes an equilibrium
strategy while 𝑎 represents a more general action.
In round 𝑗 ∈ [𝑚] of a multi-round mechanism, the mechanism takes a profile of actions 𝑎 𝑗 =
𝑗
(𝑎 1, . . . , 𝑎𝑛𝑗 ) and outputs an allocation 𝑋 𝑗 (𝑎 𝑗 ) of item 𝑗 and a profile of payments 𝑃 𝑗 (𝑎 𝑗 ). The
mechanism may condition 𝑋 𝑗 and 𝑃 𝑗 on previous rounds’ actions. Typical pot allocation procedures
in roscas resemble standard single-item auctions, with the additional restrictions that agents who
won in previous rounds are ineligible for allocation, and that payments are redistributed among all
agents.
3 We

refer to items in our abstraction to multi-item auctions and pots in the rosca application interchangeably.
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
will often alternate between writing valuations/allocation as vectors 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 or as vector valued functions 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)
for notation simplicity. Note, the output of the valuation/allocation functions could be 1x1 vectors. It should be clear from
context the dimensions of the output.

4 We
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We will consider mechanisms that are individually rational in each round i.e each agents utility
is nonnegative at the end of the mechanism. Thus, for any profile of actions in round 𝑗, the only
agent with positive payments can be the winner of item 𝑗. We will further assume that the winner’s
payments are redistributed among the losers. For example, in round 𝑗 of a rosca with a first-price
rule, agents submit bids 𝑏 1𝑗 , . . . 𝑏𝑛𝑗 . Among those who have not yet won the pot, the highest bidder
𝑖 ∗ wins, and payments are 𝑃𝑖𝑗∗ = 𝑏𝑖𝑗∗ and 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏𝑖𝑗∗ /(𝑛 − 1) for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖 ∗ . We will show that not just
first- and second-price auctions, but any “reasonble” (i.e. smooth, defined in Section 6) single-item
auctions can form the basis for an approximately-optimal rosca.
We study dynamic equilibria of roscas under incomplete information on agents’ values for
their investment opportunities. In auction notation, each agent draws their profile of values
𝑣𝑖 = (𝑣𝑖1, . . . , 𝑣𝑖𝑛 ) from a distribution 𝐹𝑖 , which is independent across agents, but correlated across
rounds (in particular, decreasing across rounds). Agents can observe histories of play in past rounds,
and hence a strategy 𝑠𝑖 is a mapping 𝑠𝑖𝑗 for each round 𝑗 from values and histories of past play to
actions/bids in round 𝑗. A profile of strategies 𝑠 = (𝑠 1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛 ) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if each
agent’s strategy maximizes their total utility across rounds, taken in expectation over other agents’
values. In what follows, we fix an auction format for pot distribution, and bound the worst-case
welfare approximation of roscas in the worst-case Bayes-Nash equilibrium, taken over all value
distributions and equilibrium strategy profiles for those value distributions. That is, we study:
E𝑣∼𝐹 [OPT(𝑣)]
,
𝑣𝑖
𝑢
𝑖 𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)), 𝑃𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)))]
Í
i.e the price of anarchy of the mechanism where OPT(𝑣) = max𝑥 ∈X 𝑖 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑥𝑖 .
max

𝐹, 𝑠 ∈BNE(𝐹 )

E𝑣∼𝐹 [

Í

6 SMOOTHNESS FOR ROSCAS
To introduce our analysis technique of smoothness, we briefly go over relevant definitions and theorems of smoothness from Syrgkanis and Tardos [46]. Then we show how the theory of smoothness
can be adapted for Roscas.
Definition 6.1 (Smoothness). A mechanism is (𝜆, 𝜇)-smooth 𝜆, 𝜇 ≥ 0 if for any valuation profile
𝑣 ∈ ×𝑖 V𝑖 and for any action profile 𝑎 there exists a randomized action a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ) for each player 𝑖
such that the following holds:
Õ
Õ
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝜆OPT(𝑣) − 𝜇
𝑃𝑖 (𝑎).
(8)
𝑖

𝑖

Smoothness trades off revenue against an agents utility for deviating from their current actions.
The definition of a smooth mechanism has a very natural interpretation as guaranteeing an
approximate analog of market cleaning prices i.e utilities are maximized, all buyers have been
serviced and all inventory has been sold. Bikhchandani [15] showed that pure Nash equilibria of
a simultaneous first price auction have market clearing prices, and this implies that the outcome
is efficient. Aggregate market clearing prices are guaranteed when each agent can modify their
bid to claim their optimal allocation at the price paid for this allocation in the current solution.
(1, 1)-smoothness in essence requires this property only in aggregate, but for any outcome of the
mechanism, not only at equilibrium. While (𝜆, 𝜇)-smoothness requires this only approximately,
both in terms of the allocation claimed, as well as the price paid for it. In addition, unlike the pure
equilibrium analysis, it requires the modified bid to be ignorant of the actions of the rest of the
players.
Lemma 6.2. If a mechanism is (𝜆, 𝜇)-smooth and individually rational then the price of anarchy of
the mechanism is at most 𝜆/max(𝜇, 1)
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Proof. See Theorem 4.2 in Syrgkanis and Tardos [46]

□

Example 6.3 (Second-Price Auction not Smooth). Take a 2-person SPA with quasilinear utilities
(i.e 𝐶 (𝑥) = 𝑥). If 𝑣 1 = 1, 𝑣 2 = 0 and if 𝑏 1 = 0 and 𝑏 2 = 1 + 𝜖 where 𝜖 > 0. Then this constitutes an
equilibrium as agent 1 wouldn’t want to change their bid as they would have to bid higher than
1 + 𝜖 to change the outcome but this results in −𝜖 < 0 utility. Agent 2 wouldnt want to change
their bid because the maximum utility they can ever get is 0 which is what they are getting in
this outcome. However, this example violates the smoothness condition and its price of anarchy is
unbounded.
Such degenerate examples can be avoided by imposing a no overbidding assumption. Under
such an assumption a weaker notion of smoothness is defined in [46] to capture mechanisms that
produce high efficiency under a no-overbidding refinement. The second-price auction satisfies this
weaker notion of smoothness and this is the weak smoothness we generalize in (Definition 6.5).
6.1 Smoothness with Internalized Sellers
The standard smoothness approach trades off revenue against agents’ deviation utilities. In auctions
with an internalized auctioneer, the former quantity is always zero. We now give an adapted
definition that generalizes to multi-round allocation mechanisms (the standard definition comes
when the number of rounds is 1) and accounts for the rebates made each round. For mechanisms
which are individually rational each round, the winners are the only agents generating payments
to be redistributed.
Definition 6.4 (Willingness-to-pay before Rebates). Let 𝑅𝑖 (𝑎) denote the rebates agent 𝑖 enjoys
under action profile 𝑎 i.e the money generated by the mechanism that is redistributed to the
losing agents. Then the maximum willingness-to-pay before rebates for an allocation 𝑥𝑖 when using
strategy 𝑎𝑖 is defined as the maximum they could ever pay before rebates conditional on allocation
𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 ) = max 𝐶 (𝑃𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝑅𝑖 (𝑎))
𝑎 −𝑖 :𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)=𝑥𝑖

Note, without internalized sellers (rebates = 0) and with quasilinear bidders (𝐶 (𝑥) = 𝑥) this
definition is exactly the definition of willingness-to-pay from [46].
Definition 6.5 (Weakly Smooth before Rebates). A multi-round allocation mechanism is weakly
(𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3 )-smooth before rebates 𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3 ≥ 0 if for any valuation profile ×𝑖 V𝑖 and for any
action profile 𝑎 there exists a randomized action a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ) for each player 𝑖 such that the following
holds:
Õ
ÕÕ
ÕÕ
ÕÕ
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝜆OPT(𝑣) − 𝜇 1
𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) − 𝜇2
𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) − 𝜇3
𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎, 𝑋 (𝑎)) (9)
𝑖

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝑗

Definition 6.6 (Smooth before Rebates). A multi-round allocation mechanism is (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )-smooth
before rebates if its weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 0)-smooth before rebates
Definition 6.7 (No Overbidding). A strategy profile 𝑎 satisfies round-wise no overbidding if
E [𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎))] ≤ E [𝑣𝑖𝑗 (𝑋𝑖𝑗 (𝑎))]
𝑎

Note this is the same as saying

𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)

𝑎

+ 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)

≤

𝐶 −1 (𝑣𝑖𝑗 (𝑋𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)))

Claim 1. All the welfare guarantees in this paper hold for smooth mechanisms (strong form) without
a no overbidding assumption.
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Proof Sketch. First, note mathematically that in all our coming proofs we only use the no
overbidding assumption to bound 𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)) and the coefficient 𝜇3 on this term is 0 in a smooth
mechanisms. Unnatural equilibria where agents overpay in an early round to induce higher payments (and therefore rebates) from their competition later on cannot hurts us. Why? Rebates in
each round have to be less than 𝐶 −1 (𝑣 𝑤𝑗 (𝑥 𝑤𝑗 )) where 𝑤 𝑗 denotes the agent who won the item
in round 𝑗. Since our mechanisms are individually rational 𝑤 𝑗 is the only one making positive
payments each round and thus they have to pay less than 𝐶 −1 (𝑣 𝑤𝑗 (𝑥 𝑤𝑗 )) to avoid negative utility.
Thus if an agents is overbidding to get higher rebates in future rounds this only works if their
overbid causes them to win in strongly smooth mechanisms but as we showed earlier the winning
agent in each round is never overbidding.
□
Lemma 6.8. For any multi-round allocation mechanism that is individually rational each round and
is weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )-smooth, the same mechanism with an internalized seller is weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )smooth before rebates.
Proof. Let 𝑀 be a mechanism satisfying the conditions of the lemma, and 𝑀ˆ the version with
an internalized seller. Denote by 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖𝑗 , 𝑅𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋𝑖 , and 𝐵𝑖𝑗 the utilities, payments, rebates, allocations,
and willingness to pay in 𝑀, and let 𝑢ˆ𝑖𝑣𝑖 , 𝑃ˆ𝑖𝑗 , 𝑅ˆ𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋ˆ𝑖 , and 𝐵ˆ𝑖𝑗 denote the same quantities in 𝑀 with an
internalized seller. For all action profiles 𝑎, 𝑢ˆ𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎) ≥ 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎). By individual rationality and the fact that
Í
Í
Í
𝑀ˆ redistributes to losers each round, we have 𝑖 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) = 𝑖 𝑃ˆ𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) + 𝑅ˆ𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) for all 𝑗. Since 𝑖 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) =
Í 𝑗
Í ˆ𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
0 as there are no rebates in the original mechanism, 𝑖 𝑃𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝑅𝑖 (𝑎) = 𝑖 𝑃𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝑅ˆ𝑖 (𝑎).Although
the presence of internalized sellers doesn’t affect payments into the mechanism, it does affect the
net payments by reducing your payments through rebates; however, by adding back the rebates
when calculating an agents willingness to pay we get that 𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎) = 𝐵ˆ𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)
□
6.2 Bayesian Extension
A mechanism that is smooth before rebates trades off revenue and rebates against bidder utilities
for any fixed pair of value and action profiles. This extends to a Bayesian tradeoff as well. We
assume the mechanism gives agents the option to withdraw (e.g. by bidding 0) and receive 0 utility.
Lemma 6.9. If an individually rational mechanism M with an internalized seller is weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3 )smooth before rebates and agents have the option to withdraw, then if buyers have disutility for
payments satisfying 𝐶 (0) = 0 and 𝐶 ′ (𝑥) ∈ [𝛼, 𝛽] for all 𝑥, value distributions are independent across
agents, and values are nonincreasing, then the price of anarchy in Bayes-Nash equilibrium of 𝑀
satisfying no overbidding is at most (𝛼 + max(𝜇1, 𝜇2 ) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜇3 )/𝜆𝛼
Proof. Let 𝑠 be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For a bidder 𝑖, consider the following “bluff” deviation
which lowerbounds their expected equilibrium utility: have them sample a value profile 𝑤
according to agents’ distributions, and play the deviation 𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑣𝑖 , 𝑤 −𝑖 ), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 )) given by smoothness
before rebates. Agent 𝑖’s expected utility from this deviation is at least:
5

E [𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑣𝑖 , 𝑤 −𝑖 ), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 ))] = E [𝑢𝑖𝑤𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑤), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 ))],

𝑣,𝑤

5 This

𝑣,𝑤

“bluffing” technique was first used in the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [46] for a similar result.
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where the latter equality follows from exchanging the roles of 𝑣 and 𝑤. Summing over agents:
"
#
hÕ
i
ÕÕ
𝑗
𝑤𝑖 ∗
E
𝑢𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 ((𝑤), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 )) ≥ 𝜆 E [OPT(𝑤)] − 𝜇1 E
𝑃𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
𝑖

𝑣,𝑤

𝑣,𝑤

𝑣,𝑤

𝑖

"
− 𝜇2 E

𝑗

#
ÕÕ

𝑣,𝑤
𝑖

𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))

"
− 𝜇3 E

#
ÕÕ

𝑣,𝑤

𝑗

𝑖

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋 (𝑠 (𝑣)))

𝑗

Note that on the right side of the inequality each expectation only depends on 𝑤 or 𝑣, but not both.
For the left side, since agents are best responding in equilibrium, we obtain
hÕ
i
ÕÕ
ÕÕ
E
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ 𝜆 E [OPT(𝑣)] − 𝜇1 E [
𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))] − 𝜇2 E [
𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))]
(10)
𝑣

𝑣

𝑣

𝑣

𝑖

𝑖

− 𝜇3 E [

ÕÕ

𝑣

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝑗

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋 (𝑠 (𝑣)))].

𝑗

The final task is to convert the above inequality into a welfare guarantee. We may write agents’
utilities as
h
Õ

E [𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))] = E 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) −
𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))).
𝑣

𝑗

𝑣

With an internalized seller, we have
ÕÕ
𝑖

(𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) − 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))) =

𝑗

ÕÕ
𝑖

(𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)))

𝑗

𝛼 (𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))

Since
individual

E

hÕÕ

𝑣

− 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))) ≤ −𝐶 (𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) − 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))) since
rationality implies 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ 0 then we obtain that

(𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) − 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))) ≤ 0 and

hÕÕ


(𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))+𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))) ≤ 𝛼 −1 E
−𝐶 (𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))−𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)))

≤ 𝛼 −1 E

𝑣

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

hÕ

𝑣

𝑗

i
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) .

𝑖

thus
ÕÕ
𝑖

𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) +

𝑗

ÕÕ

𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≤ 𝛼 −1 E

hÕ

𝑣

𝑖

𝑗

i
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) .

(11)

𝑖

Now we bound the welfare contributions from willingness-to-pay. Since no overbidding implies
that
hÕ
i
E
𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))) ≤ E𝑣 [𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))]
𝑣

𝑗

we get that

E

hÕ

𝑣

i
hÕ
i
Õ
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) = E
𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) −
𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))).
𝑣

𝑖

𝑖

𝑗

≥E

hÕÕ

𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ E

hÕÕ

𝑗

𝑣

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))) −

Õ
𝑗

𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))).

i

𝑖

E

hÕ

𝑣

i

𝑣

𝑖

E

hÕ

𝑣

𝑖

𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))

≥E

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))) − E

hÕÕ

𝑣

𝑖

i

i

𝑗

hÕÕ

𝑣

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)))

i

−𝛽E

𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)))

𝑗

hÕÕ

𝑣

𝑖

𝑗

𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) + 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))

i

i

17

Christian Ikeokwu

By the inequality (11)
hÕ
i
hÕÕ
i
h
i
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ E
𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣), 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))) − 𝛽/𝛼 E 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
E
𝑣

𝑣

𝑖

(1 + 𝛽/𝛼) E

hÕ

𝑣

𝑣

𝑖

i

𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ E

𝑗

hÕÕ

𝑣

𝑖

max(𝜇1, 𝜇2 )𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))

𝑖

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎))

i

𝑗

Note that
≥ 𝜇1 𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)) + 𝜇2 𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)). So equation (10)
becomes
hÕ
i
hÕ
i
hÕ
i
E
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ 𝜆 E [OPT(𝑣)] − max(𝜇1, 𝜇2 )/𝛼 E
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) − 𝜇3 (1 + 𝛽/𝛼) E
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
𝑣

+ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝜇1, 𝜇2 )𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))

𝑣

𝑣

𝑣

𝑖

𝑖

(𝛼 + max(𝜇1, 𝜇2 ) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜇3 )/𝛼 E

hÕ

𝑖

i

𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ 𝜆 E [OPT(𝑣)]
𝑣

𝑣

𝑖

Thus,


OPT(𝑣)
(𝛼 + max(𝜇1, 𝜇2 ) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜇3 )/𝜆𝛼 ≥ E Í 𝑣𝑖
𝑣
𝑖 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))


□

7 ROUND-ROBIN COMPOSITION
We now reduce the problem of designing a smooth rosca to the much simpler task of designing
smooth single-item auctions. In the standard formulation of Syrgkanis and Tardos [46], smooth
mechanisms are closed under sequential composition with unit-demand agents. In other words, if
𝑚 items are sold sequentially, and each item is sold with a mechanism which is smooth in isolation,
then the composite mechanism will also be smooth. Roscas have a similar structure, with the key
difference that agents who have won in earlier rounds are ineligible in later rounds. This difference
imposes a surprising obstacle, and rules out a generalization of Syrgkanis and Tardos [46]. However
under certain assumptions on agents preferences across time we are able to obtain an extension
theorem.
We first define composition for roscas. A rosca’s pot allocation procedure for a given round is
typically a single-item auction, given by 𝑀, with action space A = ×A𝑖 , allocation rule 𝑋 , and
payment rule 𝑃. We assume 𝑀 has a “withdraw” action ⊥ which guarantees agents nonpositive
payments. We allow ⊥ to induce negative payments, as we allow mechanisms with an internalized
seller, where winners’ payments are redistributed to losers. A rosca can then be thought of as 𝑛
copies of 𝑀 composed in the following sense.
Definition 7.1 (Round-Robin Composition). Given single-item auction 𝑀 = (A, 𝑋, 𝑃) with 𝑛 agents,
the 𝑛-item round-robin composition of 𝑀 is a multi-round allocation mechanism for 𝑛 items using
the following procedure. Each round 𝑗, agents submit actions 𝑎 𝑗 = (𝑎 1𝑗 , . . . , 𝑎𝑛𝑗 ). The mechanism
sets 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 for any 𝑖 who have not yet won an item, and 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = ⊥ for all 𝑖 who have won an item
previously. The mechanism then allocates item 𝑗 to agents according to 𝑀 applied to 𝑎 𝑗 and assigns
payments for round 𝑗 accordingly.
We assume agents can condition their round 𝑗 actions on play and outcomes in rounds 1, . . . , 𝑗 − 1.
A multi-round allocation mechanism that is the round-robin composition of a smooth mechanism
need not be smooth itself, due to two factors. First, agents can condition their actions on past play,
and hence a small change in an agent’s early bids might induce arbitrary behavior later. Second,
there are action profiles where agents might have high value for later items, but win in early
rounds. Smoothness deviations in these circumstances may not exist, as the following example
demonstrates.
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Example 7.2. Consider a two-round, two-agent rosca with pots allocated by first-price auction.
Values will be 𝑣 1 = (0, 1) and 𝑣 2 = (0, 0). Actions are contingency plans over bids. Our action profile
𝑎 will be he following: agent 1 bids 𝜖 in round 1 and 0 in round 2. Agent 2 bids 0 in round 1, and
then conditions their round 2 bid on agent 1’s round 1 behavior. If agent 1 bids 𝜖 in round 1, agent
2 bids 0 in round 2. Otherwise, agent 2 bids an arbitrarily large number Ω. Agent 1 does not have
a smoothness deviation that earns them any utility, and the revenue from 𝑎 is negligible. Hence,
smoothness is not preserved under round-robin composition with general values.
Definition 7.3 (Nonincreasing Values). For a multi-round allocation setting, let 𝑥𝑖𝑗 denote the
allocation where agent 𝑖 wins in round 𝑗 and loses in all other rounds. A value function 𝑣𝑖 in a
′
multi-round allocation setting is nonincreasing with time if 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑗 ) for all 𝑗 > 𝑗 ′.
Non-increasing values capture the idea that all things equal agents would rather receive the pot
earlier than later.In roscas, an agent 𝑖’s value 𝑣𝑖𝑗 for winning the pot in round 𝑗 is their total income
Í
stream in subsequent rounds, 𝑛𝑘=𝑗 𝜉𝑖𝑘 . Consequently, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 is nonincreasing in 𝑗. Nonincreasing values
allows us to prove the round robin composition property of smoothness, with loss in the smoothness
parameters. We obtain:
Theorem 7.4. Let 𝑀 be a weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2, 𝜇3 )-smooth before rebates, individually rational singleitem mechanism. Then if agents’ values are nonincreasing with time, then the round-robin composition
is weakly (min(1, 𝜆), 1 + 𝜇1, 1 + 𝜇2, 𝜇3 )-smooth before rebates.
The proof uses the smoothness deviations for the single-item mechanism to explicitly construct
deviations for the composition, using a similar strategy to the proof of Lemma A.1.
Proof. For an 𝑛-item setting, an optimal allocation given value profile 𝑣 is an assignment from
agents 𝑖 to items 𝑗𝑖∗ . For values 𝑣 and action profile 𝑎, we construct a deviation a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ) for each
agent 𝑖 in the following way. Agent 𝑖 simulates their equilibrium strategy up until round 𝑗𝑖∗ − 1
and then in 𝑗𝑖∗ they play their smoothness deviation for 𝑀 on value profile 𝑣ˆ and action 𝑎𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖,
where 𝑣ˆ𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 and 0 for all other agents. They withdraw in all subsequent rounds. If, in simulating
𝑎𝑖 , agent 𝑖 wins in some round 𝑗ˆ𝑖 ≤ 𝑗𝑖∗ they similarly withdraw in all subsequent rounds, and do
not play their smoothness deviation at 𝑗𝑖∗ .
Let 𝑆 EQ denote the set of agents whose deviations cause them to win before 𝑗𝑖∗ and let 𝑆 OPT
denote the set of agents who don’t win before 𝑗𝑖∗ hence are able to play their smoothness deviation
in round 𝑗𝑖∗ . For agents in 𝑆 OPT , the choice of smoothness deviation for round 𝑗𝑖∗ implies:
Õ 𝑗∗
Õ 𝑗∗
Õ 𝑗∗
𝑗∗
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝜆 · 𝑣𝑖 𝑖 − 𝜇1
𝑃𝑖 𝑖 (𝑎) − 𝜇2
𝑅𝑖 𝑖 (𝑎) − 𝜇3
𝐵𝑘𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)),
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

For agents in 𝑆 EQ if 𝑗ˆ𝑖 denotes the round they actually win in then
ˆ

ˆ

𝑗∗

ˆ

𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) + 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑖 (𝑎) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 𝑖 ),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that 𝑖’s utility and payment in round 𝑗ˆ𝑖 sum to
ˆ
𝑣𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑖 ) and they get 0 rebates as a winner, and the second from the nonincreasing values property.
Summing over agents, we obtain:
"
#
Õ
Õ 𝑗∗
Õ 𝑗∗
Õ 𝑗∗
𝑣𝑖 ∗
𝑢𝑖 (a𝑖 (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) + 𝜇1
𝑃𝑘𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝜇2
𝑅𝑘𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝜇3
𝐵𝑘𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)))
𝑖 ∈𝑆 OPT

𝑘

𝑘

𝑘

i
Õ h
ˆ
ˆ
+
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) + 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑖 (𝑎) + 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑖 (𝑎) ≥ min(1, 𝜆)OPT(𝑣).
𝑖 ∈𝑆 EQ
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Furthermore, we have that both of:
Õ Õ

𝑗∗

𝑃𝑘𝑖 (𝑎)

Õ

and

𝑖 ∈𝑆 OPT 𝑘

are at most

Í Í
𝑖

𝑗

𝑖 ∈𝑆 EQ

𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)
Õ Õ

𝑗∗

𝑅𝑘𝑖 (𝑎)

Õ

and

𝑖 ∈𝑆 OPT 𝑘

are at most

Í Í
𝑖

ˆ

𝑃𝑘𝑗𝑖 (𝑎)

𝑗
𝑗 𝑅𝑖 (𝑎)

and that
Õ Õ

ˆ

𝑅𝑘𝑗𝑖 (𝑎)

𝑖 ∈𝑆 EQ

𝑗∗

𝐵𝑘𝑖 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎)) ≤

𝑖 ∈𝑆 OPT 𝑘

ÕÕ
𝑖

𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎))

𝑗

Substituting these upper bounds and recalling that 𝑆 OPT and 𝑆 EQ partition the set of agents we get
ÕÕ
ÕÕ
ÕÕ
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (a𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ min(1, 𝜆)OPT(𝑣)−(1+𝜇1 )
𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)−(1+𝜇2 )
𝑅𝑖𝑗 (𝑎)−𝜇3
𝐵𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖 , 𝑋𝑖 (𝑎))
𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝑗

𝑖

𝑗

□
8 ROBUST WELFARE IN ROSCAS
We now combine the pieces developed in the previous sections to show two sets of welfare
guarantees in roscas. First, we give a general result: reasonable (i.e. smooth) single-item mechanisms
make approximately-optimal roscas. Second, we give a specific guarantees for first-price/descendingprice and second-price/descending-price roscas by analyzing the single-item mechanism without
an internalized seller and applying the general result.
Theorem 8.1. Let 𝑀 be an individually rational single-item auction which is weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )smooth when 𝐶 satisfies 𝐶 (0) = 0 and 𝐶 ′ (𝑥) ∈ [𝛼, 𝛽]. If values are nonincreasing and value distributions are independent across agents the 𝑛-round round-robin sequential composition of 𝑀 with an
internalized seller has price of anarchy at most
1 + 𝛼 + 𝜇1 + (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜇2
𝛼 min(1, 𝜆)
in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium without overpayment.
Proof. Because 𝑀 is weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )-smooth with quasilinear bidders, Lemma 6.8 implies
that with an internalized seller, it is also weakly (𝜆, 𝜇1, 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )-smooth before rebates, still with
quasilinear bidders. Furthermore, Theorem 7.4 implies that the round robin composition of 𝑀 is
also (min(1, 𝜆), 1 + 𝜇1, 1 + 𝜇1, 𝜇2 )-smooth before rebates with quasilinear bidders. The Bayesian
extension of Lemma 6.9 then implies that the price of anarchy of the mechanism is at most
(𝛼 + max(1 + 𝜇1, 1 + 𝜇1 ) + (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝜇2 )/𝛼 min(1, 𝜆)
□
Welfare in First-Price Roscas
A first-price rosca proceeds in the following way. Each round 𝑗, agents 𝑖 who have not yet won
an item submit sealed bids 𝑏𝑖𝑗 . The highest bidder wins the item and is charged the highest bid
𝑏 (1) . Importantly, losers are rebated 𝑏 (1) /(𝑛 − 1). To give a welfare guarantee for the first-price
rosca by Theorem 8.1, we only need to consider just the single-item first-price auction without an
internalized seller. However, smoothness guarantees from existing work only hold for quasilinear
agents. We adapt the standard bound as follows:
Lemma 8.2. The single-item first price auction is ((1 − 1/𝑒 𝛽 )𝛽 −1, 1)-smooth with convex disutility
for payments if 𝐶 ′ (𝑥) ≤ 𝛽, 𝐶 (0) = 0.
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Proof. We generalize the deviation from [46]. The highest valued agent, say index ℎ, can deviate
1
to submitting a randomized bid 𝑏ℎ′ drawn from the distribution with density function 𝑓 (𝑥) = 𝑣ℎ −𝛽
·𝑥
and support [0, (1 − 1/𝑒 𝛽 )𝑣ℎ /𝛽]. The utility of the highest bidder from this deviation is:


𝑢ℎ𝑣ℎ (𝑏ℎ′ , 𝑏 −ℎ )

∫
≥

1−

1
𝑒𝛽



𝑣ℎ
𝛽

(𝑣ℎ − 𝐶 (𝑥))𝑓 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥

max𝑖≠ℎ 𝑏𝑖


∫ 1− 1 𝑣ℎ
𝛽
𝛽

≥

𝑒

(𝑣ℎ − 𝛽 · 𝑥)𝑓 (𝑥)𝑑𝑥

max𝑖≠ℎ 𝑏𝑖



1 𝑣ℎ
≥ 1− 𝛽
− max 𝑏𝑖 .
𝑖
𝛽
𝑒
Since the expected revenue is at least max𝑖 𝑏𝑖 , OPT(𝑣) = 𝑣ℎ and the utilities and payments from all
other agents are nonnegative the result follows.
□
Applying Theorem 8.1, we obtain:
Corollary 8.3. If values are nonincreasing, the first-price rosca has price of anarchy at most
 𝛽 
(𝛼 + 2)𝛽
𝑒
𝛽
𝛼
𝑒 −1
in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium without overpayment.
With quasilinear agents, 𝐶 (𝑥) = 𝑥 for all 𝑥, and Corollary 8.3 yields a price of anarchy of
3𝑒/(𝑒 − 1) ≈ 4.75. The guarantee degrades smoothly as agents’ utilities become less linear in wealth.

Welfare in Second-Price Roscas
A second-price rosca proceeds in the following way. Each round 𝑗, agents 𝑖 who have not yet won
an item submit sealed bids 𝑏𝑖𝑗 . The highest bidder wins the item and is charged the second-highest
bid 𝑏 (2) . Importantly, losers are rebated 𝑏 (2) /(𝑛 − 1). We can also give guarantees for second-price
roscas. As before, by Theorem 8.1, we need not consider more than one item or an internalized
seller.
Lemma 8.4. The single-item second-price auction is weakly (1, 0, 1)-smooth with convex disutility
for payments if 𝛼 ≤ 𝐶 ′ (𝑥) ≤ 𝛽, 𝐶 (0) = 0 and under no overbidding.
Proof. Let 𝑣ℎ be the value of the highest bidder ℎ. Then ℎ can play a deviation 𝑏ℎ′ = 𝑣ℎ /𝛼.
Case 1. If ℎ wins with 𝑏ℎ′ then
𝑢ℎ𝑣ℎ (𝑏ℎ′ , 𝑏 −ℎ ) = 𝑣ℎ − 𝐶 (𝑏 (2) )
𝑢ℎ𝑣ℎ (𝑏ℎ′ , 𝑏 −ℎ ) ≥ 𝑣ℎ − 𝐵 (2) 𝑏 (2) , 𝑋 (2) (𝑏)



by definition
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Case 2. If ℎ loses with 𝑏ℎ′ then
𝑏 (2) ≥ 𝑣ℎ /𝛼
𝐶 (𝑏 (2) ) ≥ 𝐶 (𝑣ℎ /𝛼)

by monotonicity of 𝐶

𝐶 (𝑏 (2) ) ≥ 𝑣ℎ

since 𝐶 (𝑥) ≥ 𝛼𝑥 when 𝑥 ≥ 0

𝐵 (2) (𝑏 (2) , 𝑋 (2) (𝑏)) ≥ 𝑣ℎ

by definition

𝑢ℎ𝑣ℎ (𝑏ℎ′ , 𝑏 −ℎ )

≥ 𝑣ℎ − 𝐵 (2) (𝑏 (2) , 𝑋 (2) (𝑏))

since utilities are nonnegative

These are the only two cases, so since OPT(𝑣) = 𝑣ℎ and since the utilities and willingness-to-pay
from all other agents are nonnegative the result follows.
□
Applying Theorem 8.1, we obtain:
Corollary 8.5. If values are nonincreasing and assuming no overbidding, the second-price rosca
has price of anarchy at most
1+𝛽
2+
𝛼
in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium without overbidding.
With quasilinear agents, 𝐶 (𝑥) = 𝑥 for all 𝑥, and Corollary 8.5 yields a price of anarchy of 3.
The guarantee degrades smoothly as agents’ utilities become less linear in wealth. A direct proof
for a price of anarchy bound of 1 + 2𝛽/𝛼 for second-price roscas appeared in an earlier version
of this work see Theorem A.2 in Appendix A.1 for this proof. However, the theory developed
for weakly smooth mechanisms, like the second-price auction, in this paper allows us to prove a
comparable constant-factor 6 approximation with significantly less work than that done for the
proof of Theorem A.2.
9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This work derives welfare guarantees for roscas which are robust in two senses: they are agnostic
to the precise choice of value distributions and equilibria for those distributions, and they permit
a variety of pot allocation protocols. This gives evidence that roscas can effectively coordinate
joint saving by agents with investment opportunities which vary across time and between agents.
The result provides further explanation for their wide use across many continents and more
broadly demonstrates the power of mutual aid groups, informal financial organizations and other
decentralized vehicles for community empowerment.
Our work suggests many further lines of inquiry where insights from algorithmic game theory
may improve our understanding of these important financial institutions. Our modeling decisions
focus on the ability of roscas to efficiently coordinate saving across time. Several authors have
noted that roscas can serve as insurance as well [19, 34, 35]: agents with unanticipated, urgent
financial needs can bid to obtain the pot earlier than they had planned. In general, understanding
the efficiency of roscas as agents’ values and incomes evolve stochastically over time, as well in the
presence of heterogeneous wealth, poses significant technical challenges that might benefit from a
variety of analytical perspectives.
One particular difficulty lies in the tension between allocative efficiency and wealth inequality.
That is, agents with valuable investment opportunities may not be incentivized to bid aggressively,
because low wealth causes them to value cash highly. This is particularly problematic when agents
experience income shocks, a more common occurrence for economically vulnerable individuals
6 Note

these bounds agree for quasilinear bidders, but if 𝛼 < 𝛽 strictly, equivalent to 𝐶 (𝑥) ≠ 𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏, the bound given by
Corollary 8.5 is tighter.
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[1]. One way rosca participants navigate this tension is altruism. Roscas often serve a dual role of
community-building institutions. Consequently, agents tend to observe signals about each others
shocks, and act with mutual aid in mind [36], [38]. Characterizing the way these phenomena
interact, through game-theoretic, network science, or other approaches, seems key to building a
broader theory for understanding how people self-organize to create opportunity.
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APPENDIX
A OMITTED PROOFS AND RESULTS
A.1 Welfare in Second-Price Roscas
Our analysis will proceed in the spirit of the weak smoothness framework of [46]: for each bidder,
we will construct a deviation strategy which exhibits a tradeoff between their utility and the bids
of other agents in the auction. Our tradeoff will hold in every deterministic profile of actions and
for every value profile. We then show how to extend the deviation to derive a welfare result in
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. In what follows, recall that actions in a rosca are contingency plans over
bids 𝑏𝑖𝑗 in each round.
Lemma A.1. For any value profile 𝑣 and action profile 𝑎 of a second-price rosca, there exists a
deviation action 𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ) for each agent 𝑖 such that the following inequality holds:
Õ
Õ
𝑗 
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ OPT(𝑣) − 2
𝐶 𝑏 (1)
,
(12)
𝑖
𝑗
where 𝑏 (1)

𝑗

denotes the highest in round 𝑗 under action profile 𝑎.

The proof will emulate the closure of smooth mechanisms under simultaneous composition in
[46]: we will have each agent 𝑖 emulate their strategy 𝑎𝑖 until the item they would win in the optimal
assignment, then target the item they would win in the optimal assignment. A key distinction is that
if 𝑖 wins before their targeted round, they are disqualified from future rounds. Under nonincreasing
values, we show that this doesn’t hurt much.
Proof. An optimal allocation given value profile 𝑣 is an assignment from agents 𝑖 to items 𝑗𝑖∗ .
For values 𝑣 and action profile 𝑎, we construct a deviation 𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ) for each agent 𝑖 in the following
way. Agent 𝑖 simulates their equilibrium strategy up until round 𝑗𝑖∗ − 1. In round 𝑗𝑖∗, they bid
𝑗∗
𝐶 −1 (𝑣𝑖 𝑖 ) and then 0 in all subsequent rounds. If, in simulating 𝑎𝑖 , agent 𝑖 wins in some round 𝑗ˆ𝑖 < 𝑗𝑖∗
they similarly bid 0 in all subsequent rounds including 𝑗𝑖∗ . Let 𝑆 EQ denote the set of agents whose
deviations cause them to win in some 𝑗ˆ𝑖 < 𝑗𝑖∗, and let 𝑆 OPT denote the set of agents who don’t win
before 𝑗𝑖∗ and hence are deviate in round 𝑗𝑖∗ . Note that 𝑆 EQ and 𝑆 OPT together partition the set of
agents.
For each agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 OPT , we may consider two cases, based on whether their deviation causes
them to win or lose in round 𝑗. If they win, let 𝑖 ′ be the highest bidder other than 𝑖. Since 𝑖 incurs
𝑗∗
nonnegative utility outside of round 𝑗𝑖∗ , we have that 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 𝑖 − 𝐶 (𝑏𝑖 ′ ). We can
therefore write:
𝑗∗
𝑗 
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) + 𝐶 𝑏 (1)
≥ 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) + 𝐶 (𝑏𝑖 ′ ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 𝑖 .
𝑗∗

If 𝑖 instead loses with their deviation in round 𝑗𝑖∗ , then we instead have 𝑏𝑖 ′ ≥ 𝐶 −1 (𝑣𝑖 𝑖 ). Since 𝐶 is
increasing, we obtain
𝑗∗

𝑗∗

𝑖
𝐶 (𝑏 (1)
) ≥ 𝐶 (𝑏𝑖 ′ ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 𝑖 .

In either case, we have shown that for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 OPT ,
𝑗∗
𝑗𝑖∗ 
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖 𝑖 − 𝐶 𝑏 (1)
.

(13)

For each agent 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 EQ, meanwhile, note that their payments are nonpositive outside round 𝑗ˆ𝑖 .
Since utility is value minus disutility for payments, we can write:
∗
ˆ
𝑗ˆ𝑖 
𝑗ˆ𝑖 
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑖 − 𝐶 𝑏 (2)
≥ 𝑣𝑖𝑗 − 𝐶 𝑏 (1)
,
(14)
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where the second inequality follows from the nonincreasing values assumption and the fact that
𝑗ˆ𝑖
𝑗ˆ𝑖
𝑏 (1)
≥ 𝑏 (2)
.
Summing over all agents, we obtain
Õ
Õ
Õ
𝑗𝑖∗ 
𝑗ˆ𝑖 
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ (𝑣, 𝑎𝑖 ), 𝑎 −𝑖 ) ≥ OPT(𝑣) −
𝐶 𝑏 (1)
−
𝐶 𝑏 (1)
.
𝑗 ∈𝑆 OPT

𝑖

𝑗 ∈𝑆 EQ

𝑗𝑖∗

Since each round 𝑗 is for at most one agent 𝑖 and 𝑗ˆ𝑖 for at most one agent 𝑖. we may weaken the
above inequality to obtain (12).
□
We are now in a position to reason about the second-price rosca in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The
main result of this section is the following.
Theorem A.2. Assuming no overbidding and nonincreasing values, the price of anarchy for the
second-price rosca is at most 1 + 2𝛽/𝛼 in Bayes-Nash equilibrium with independently distributed values
across agents.
The guarantee in Theorem A.2 depends on the shape of the disutility function 𝐶, but degrades
smoothly away from a price of anarchy of 3 as the ratio of 𝐶’s slopes varies away from 1. The proof
follows the “bluffing” template of [46]. Note that we require independence across agents, but not
across the values for a particular agent. In fact, the nonincreasing values assumption rules the latter
sort of independence out almost always.
Proof. Let 𝑠 be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For a bidder 𝑖, consider the following “bluff” deviation
which lowerbounds their expected equilibrium utility: have them sample a value profile 𝑤 according
to agents’ distributions, and play 𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑣𝑖 , 𝑤 −𝑖 ), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 )), where 𝑎𝑖∗ is as defined in Lemma A.1. We
may therefore lower bound ex ante equilibrium expected utility E𝑣 [𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))] as:
E𝑣,𝑤 [𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑣𝑖 , 𝑤 −𝑖 ), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 ))]
= 𝐸 𝑣,𝑤 [𝑢𝑖𝑤𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑤), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 ))],
where the latter inequality follows from exchanging the roles of 𝑣 and 𝑤, which is valid because of
independence. Summing over agents and applying Lemma A.1, we have:
hÕ
i
E𝑣,𝑤
𝑢𝑖𝑤𝑖 (𝑎𝑖∗ ((𝑤), 𝑠𝑖 (𝑣𝑖 )), 𝑠 −𝑖 (𝑣 −𝑖 ))
𝑖
h Õ
i
𝑗 
≥ 𝐸 𝑣,𝑤 [OPT(𝑤)] − 𝐸 𝑣,𝑤 2
𝐶 𝑏 (1)
𝑗
hÕ
i
≥ 𝐸 𝑣 [OPT(𝑣)] − 2𝐸 𝑣
𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
(15)
𝑖

where the second inequality follows from the no-overbidding assumption, and the third from the
fact that payments are redistributed.
To obtain a welfare bound, note that expected utilities can be written as
Õ


𝐸 𝑣 [𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))] = 𝐸 𝑣 𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) −
𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))).
𝑗

Therefore we have
Í Í


𝐸 𝑣 𝑖 𝑗 max(𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))), 0)
· 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
Í
 ≤ Í Í
(16)
,
𝐸 𝑣 𝑖 𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣))
𝐸 𝑣 𝑖 𝑗 − min(𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))), 0)
Í
obtained by subtracting 𝐸 𝑣 [𝑣𝑖 · 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) − 𝑗 max(𝐶 (𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣))), 0).] from the numerator and denominator of the lefthand side, which is nonnegative by the no overbidding assumption. With an
internalized seller, we have
𝐸𝑣

Í

𝑖 𝑣𝑖
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ÕÕ
𝑖

− min(𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)), 0) =

𝑗

ÕÕ
𝑖

max(𝑃𝑖𝑗 (𝑠 (𝑣)), 0).

𝑗

Since 𝐶 (0) = 0 and 𝐶 ′ (𝑥) ∈ [𝛼, 𝛽], the righthand side of (16) is at most 𝛽/𝛼. Combining with
(15), we obtain:
E𝑣

hÕ
𝑖

i
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) ≥ 𝐸 𝑣 [OPT(𝑣)] −

2𝛽
𝛼 𝐸𝑣

hÕ
𝑖

i
𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑖 (𝑠 (𝑣)) .
□

The result follows from rearranging.

Note that for dynamic games under incomplete information as in our model, the usual equivalence of equilibria between sealed-bid and ascending-price mechanisms does not necessarily hold.
However, the proof of Theorem A.2 remains valid, because of its reliance on deviation bids. A
deviation in the sealed-bid version of the game corresponds to a deviation in the ascending-price
game via the usual correspondence, and the no overbidding assumption becomes an assumption
that players drop out before they would begin incurring negative utility.
A.2 No Overbidding in Strongly Smooth Mechanisms
Proof Sketch. Rebates in each round have to be less than 𝐶 −1 (𝑣 𝑤𝑗 (𝑥 𝑤𝑗 )) where 𝑤 𝑗 denotes the
agent who won the item in round 𝑗. Since our mechanisms are individually rational 𝑤 𝑗 is the only
one making positive payments each round and thus they have to pay less than 𝐶 −1 (𝑣 𝑤𝑗 (𝑥 𝑤𝑗 )) to
avoid negative utility. Thus if an agents is overbidding to get higher rebates in future rounds this
only works if their overbid causes them to win in strongly smooth mechanisms but as we showed
earlier the winning agent in each round is never overbidding.
□
B LINEAR PROGRAMMING FOR AFTER-MARKET
This is the linear program used to construct worst case examples for swap-stable assignments with
non-increasing values.

maximize

subject to

𝑛
Õ
𝑖=1
𝑛
Õ

𝑣𝑖𝑖 −

𝑛 Õ
𝑛
Õ

𝑎𝑖 𝑗 𝑣 𝑖 𝑗

𝑖=1 𝑗=1

𝑣𝑖𝑖

𝑖=1
𝑣𝑖 𝑗

𝑎𝑖 𝑗 𝑣 𝑖 𝑗 + 𝑎𝑖 ′ 𝑗 ′ 𝑣 𝑖 ′ 𝑗 ′
𝑣𝑖 𝑗
𝑣𝑖 𝑗

≥

𝑛 Í
𝑛
Í

𝑎𝑖 𝑗 𝑣 𝑖 𝑗 ,

𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛

𝑖=1 𝑗=1

≥ 𝑣𝑖 𝑗 ′ ,
if 𝑗 < 𝑗 ′, ∀𝑖 ∈ 1, . . . , 𝑛
≥ 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 𝑣𝑖 𝑗 ′ + 𝑎𝑖 ′ 𝑗 ′ 𝑣𝑖 ′ 𝑗 , ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑖 ′, 𝑗 ′ ∈ 1, . . . , 𝑛 if 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖 ′ 𝑗 ′ ≥ 1
≤1
∀𝑖, 𝑗
≥0
∀𝑖, 𝑗

• 𝑣𝑖 𝑗 are the LP decision variables, and are person 𝑖’s value for getting assigned position 𝑗
• 𝑎𝑖 𝑗 are constant indicators for whether person 𝑖 is assigned position 𝑗
The python implementation using Gurobi [29] for the 𝑥 (1) = 3, 𝑥 (2) = 1, 𝑥 (3) = 2 swap-stable
assignment is displayed on the following pages.
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